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THREE ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
Amanda M. Mandzik 
 
As a region, sub-Saharan Africa lags behind the rest of the world 
in both human development and economic growth. However, a 
portion of the development literature suggests that institutions may 
play a role in explaining, and perhaps changing, the outcomes that 
are observed in these countries. Therefore, this dissertation 
explores how institutions have shaped and continue to shape the 
health and economic outcomes of this region. In Chapter 2, jointly 
with Andrew Young, we seek to explain the correlation between 
high HIV prevalence rates and the Christian share of the 
population that contrasts with low HIV prevalence rates observed 
with the Muslim share of the population. We conclude that, while 
male circumcision (a predominantly Muslim tradition) is inversely 
related with HIV prevalence, some other cultural factor continues 
to drive the correlation between Christianity and HIV.  
Chapter 3 compares the role of democracy to economic 
freedom in determining health outcomes in African countries. 
After incorporating controls, I find that economic freedom is 
associated with higher life expectancy and lower infant mortality 
while democracy is not. However, I also find that the effectiveness 
of economic institutions depends in part on the resources that are 
present in a given country. In the absence of water access, for 
example, a stronger government may play a role in providing 
public goods for the benefit of the health of the population. 
In Chapter 4, I investigate the institutional determinants of 
the high levels of shadow economic activity present in the sub-
Saharan region. My findings show that improved legal and 
property protection in addition to a sound money supply decreases 
informality within a given country. Furthermore, by employing a 
spatial econometric model, I find that countries that are neighbors 
to a country with less intrusive government oversight are likely to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
A great deal of attention has been given to understanding why some nations perform so much 
better than others both economically and developmentally. A portion of the development 
literature contends that this is a result of geography or natural resources—or, figuratively, the 
cards that have been dealt to a country from the beginning. Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) 
observe that nearly all tropical countries are poor while almost all countries in higher latitudes 
are rich. Furthermore, temperate countries in the northern hemisphere are the wealthiest. They 
conclude that location, climate, and geography affect growth and development through transport 
costs, disease burden, agricultural productivity, and economic policy. As an alternative 
explanation, resource endowments may determine success or failure. Sachs and Warner (2001) 
propose that a nation may suffer from natural resource abundance, which creates high-price 
economies that cause a country to miss out on export-led growth.  
 Beyond geography and resources, a case is also made for the visibly intangible 
characteristics of a country as the most significant determinants of development: institutions. 
Institutions structure the way a society runs and are established both formally and informally in 
everything from legal codes to markets to religions to a simple social norm such as a handshake. 
Acemoglu et. al (2001) find evidence that geography has no independent effect on development 
but instead that institutions are the significant indicator of development. This provides a more 
optimistic view that less developed countries can both determine and restructure the rules of their 
societies to generate future growth and development.  
 In the following chapters, I turn my attention specifically to sub-Saharan Africa where 
institutions may have a role to play moving forward. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the 
world facing the lowest levels of development in terms of health and economics. Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been hit the hardest by the HIV/AIDS epidemic with 68 percent of the world’s HIV 
positive patients living in the region (UNAIDS World AIDS Day Report 6, p. 7).  The infant 
mortality rate in Africa is about six times higher than that in Europe, and average life expectancy 
is under 60 years of age (WHO, 2014). In 2010, almost 50% of the sub-Saharan population was 
living on less than $1.25 day, and the average income per capita was just over $1,000 as 
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compared to about $50,000 in the United States (World Bank, 2014). Sub-Saharan Africa has the 
largest shadow economy (as a percentage of “official” gross domestic product) with a median of 
40.5 percent, which indicates that there is a large portion of the population that cannot or chooses 
not to participate in the official economy of their own country (Schneider, et al. 2010). 
North (1990) asserts that “institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic 
theory, determine the opportunities in a society” (North, 1990, p. 7). Therefore, I employ an 
institutional approach to modeling how the prevailing institutions in the region have and 
continue to shape the AIDS crisis, poor health outcomes, and the large informal sector. In 
Chapter 2, with Andrew Young, I explore the role of religion in sub-Saharan Africa. A map (see 
Figure 1 in Chapter 2) of HIV rates reveals that the northern part of the continent is relatively 
less affected (near 0%) by the HIV virus while some southern countries have experienced HIV 
prevalence rates as high as 25% and above (World Bank, 2014). This geographical pattern 
corresponds with the religious demographic composition of the continent: the north is 
predominantly Muslim while the south is predominantly Christian. Interpreting religion as a 
“bundle” of institutions, we attempt to unwrap the cultural norms associated with each religion in 
order to determine the more specific drivers of HIV prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa. We find 
that male circumcision, which is culturally linked to Islam, has a large negative effect on HIV 
prevalence. Nevertheless, the Christian population share remains to robust to controlling for male 
circumcision which indicates that there is some other unaccounted factor associated with being a 
Christian in this region that is causing the relatively high HIV rates in the south. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the impact of both political and economic institutions on health 
outcomes of infant mortality and life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the broad 
characterization of the term “institutions” extends across a wide range of contexts failing to 
consider the more specific channels of both political and economic institutions. Furthermore, the 
actual mechanisms through which institutions may improve health are not easily disentangled. In 
this study, I first compare the impact of economic and political institutions on health. Next, I 
investigate specific institutional determinants of health by breaking down the institutional index 
into its sub-components. As an extension, I then interact these specific channels with the 
availability of water to see if institutions react with other resources to stimulate positive health 
outcomes. I conclude that economic institutions, specifically limited regulations, sound money 
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supply, trade freedom, and small government, are the institutional conduits of improved health 
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. As an extension to this study, I find that the presence of 
economic freedom in a country may allow improved water access to impact health outcomes 
more effectively than improved water access would by itself. However, there is also evidence 
that there may be a role for more government intervention in the provision of public goods, 
specifically water, in order to reduce infant mortality.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider the role of institutions in a country or in neighboring 
countries on the extent of informal sector activity that is present. By definition, the shadow 
economy exists outside of the recognition of a national government’s oversight. Therefore, it 
would seem as though national borders should matter little when considering the spread of the 
informal sector. Nevertheless, it reasonable to think that the set of institutions fostered by a given 
country will motivate an individual’s decision of whether to operate within the formal or 
informal economy. Stronger, business-friendly institutions are more apt to encourage people to 
participate in the official economy while weaker institutions attract individuals to alternatives to 
the official economy. With one of the largest shares of shadow economic activity worldwide, 
sub-Saharan Africa offers a lens to study the geographic flows of informal sector activity among 
countries. By employing a spatial econometric model, this study examines the extent to which 
informality spills across national borders in sub-Saharan Africa through specific economic 




Chapter 2: Religion and AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unbundling Religious 
Institutions (coauthored with Andrew Young) 
2.1 Introduction 
 
An estimated 34 million people suffer from HIV worldwide, and although the sub-Saharan 
African region accounts for only 12 percent of the global population, 68 percent of HIV positive 
individuals reside in sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS World AIDS Day Report 6, p.7). In 2010 
alone, AIDS claimed 1.2 million lives in sub-Saharan African countries (AVERT, 2011). The 
loss of life and health is especially destructive to a region of the world that is characterized by a 
lack of economic development. 
HIV is neither an airborne nor a waterborne virus, and unlike other devastating viruses 
(e.g., Malaria), HIV does not transmit across human populations via contact with other species.1 
The evolution of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is, therefore, almost exclusively determined by human 
interactions. The institutions governing those interactions are therefore of first-order importance 
to understanding the pandemic. As the “rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p.3), 
institutions shape the incentives – the relative costs and benefits – that individuals face in 
deciding how to act and interact with others.  
Religions represent particular bundles of institutions, and this paper explores the role of 
religions in the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS pandemic. There are compelling prima facie reasons to 
believe that religious institutions are critical to understanding this pandemic. Figure 1 provides 
two maps: the one to the left displays the Muslim share of the population (average from 2000-
2009) while the one to the right shows HIV prevalence rates for this time period. These maps 
effectively paint an account in which the northern, predominantly Muslim countries are 
relatively less affected by HIV while the southern, predominantly Christian countries are 
relatively more affected by HIV prevalence. Figure 2 plots, using data from the year 2000, HIV 
prevalence rates against, separately, Christian and Muslim population shares. Christianity 
positively correlates with HIV rates while Islam negatively correlates with HIV rates. Best-fit 
OLS regression lines are included in figure 2 and the estimates of the slopes are both statistically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is commonly believed that HIV did initially jump the species barrier in Western or Central Africa to the human 
population from another primate species. 
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significant at the 1% level. Eyeballing the scatter plots suggests that the relationships may be 
logarithmic and columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report the bivariate regression results.2 The R2s are 
both greater than 0.340. Either religion variable accounts for more than a third of the variation in 
sub-Saharan cross-country HIV rates.  Column 3 of table 1 reports results from a regression of 
HIV rates on both religious variables. The coefficient estimates are again positive for the 
Christian share, negative for Muslim share, and statistically significant in both cases (though 
now at the 10 percent level in the case of Muslim). 
Neither religion (at least in its major variants) is known to explicitly advocate “high risk” 
behavior such as intravenous drug use, prostitution, promiscuity, or homosexuality.3 The puzzle, 
then, is how these respective frameworks structure human interactions and lead, directly or 
indirectly, towards relatively higher or lower occurrences of infection. In other words, we seek to 
unbundle Christianity and Islam in a way that identifies institutional components (e.g., sexual 
norms) that are likely to affect the relative rates of HIV infection.4 Having done so, we construct 
a panel of data on up to 43 sub-Saharan African countries that includes proxies for these 
institutional components. Using this data, we attempt to empirically assess which of these are 
important determinants of cross-country variation in sub-Saharan HIV rates. In doing so we 
include various additional controls that are suggested by the literature: population density, urban 
population shares, GDP per capita levels, date of first recorded HIV case, and a country’s 
latitude.  
 We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides some brief background on the HIV virus and 
the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS pandemic. In regards to the role of religion in this pandemic, we 
review the contributions of previous researchers in section 3. In section 4 we unbundle 
Christianity and Islam into what we believe to be relevant institutional components and then, in 
section 5, we describe a data set constructed to include proxies for those components. An 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Christian and Muslim population shares have 1 added to them before taking logs to account for observations 
where the reported share is zero.	  
3 To be clear, “high risk” in this context only refers to the likelihood of the virus spreading through the human 
contact associated with the behavior. 
4 As North (1989, p. 1321) stresses, institutions include “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of 
behavior” (emphasis added). For example, there can be large differences in effect between, e.g., premarital 
abstinence norms across religions. One way that we address this in the empirical analysis that follows is by 
controlling for a measure of the strength of social regulation of religious mores.  
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empirical analysis of the role of these component institutions is found in section 6. Concluding 
discussion follows in section 7.  
 
2.2 The Sub-Saharan African HIV/AIDS Pandemic 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is the retrovirus that causes acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS). The retrovirus functions by converting its own genetic template (viral RNA) 
to the host organism’s genetic information (host DNA) while using the host cells’ energy and 
chemical resources for this replication process (Marlink and Kotin, 2004, p. 2). The DNA of a 
host cell becomes integrated with the viral DNA leaving the host cell invisible to the immune 
system. Upon infection, the mutation of host cells occurs rapidly, although the HIV virus may 
remain dormant for some time. As the HIV virus progresses into advanced stages, the condition 
turns into AIDS, which ultimately is the condition that results in the deterioration of the immune 
system. Consequently, AIDS deaths typically result from opportunistic infections and tumors 
that the body could normally fend off. 
 The African strain of the AIDS virus was first officially identified in 1983 among several 
African patients treated in Belgium and France (Carael, 2006). Experts now believe, however, 
that the virus has been present in humans for a considerably longer time. In particular, there is a 
consensus that HIV was transferred from chimpanzees to humans in Central Africa at some point 
between the 1930s and 1940s (AVERT, 2013). HIV has been traced to stored human blood from 
1959, and it is likely that the first epidemic occurred in Kinshasa of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in the 1970s (Denis 2006; AVERT, 2013). Geographically, the virus began to spread in 
the early 1980s within the central band of the continent stretching from West Africa to the Indian 
Ocean, and it progressively moved southward at the end of the decade (UNAIDS and WHO, 
2003). In 1990, the Sub-Saharan HIV prevalence rate was 2.5%, and this rate increased steadily 
until 2000 when it reached 5.95% (World Bank, 2013). Despite campaigns to curtail the virus’ 
spread, the 2011 prevalence rate was still a disturbingly high 4.9% (World Bank, 2013).   
Although the virus has permeated throughout Africa, the severity of the epidemic varies 
widely depending on region. The northern and western regions have remained relatively less 
affected while southern countries have been the most devastated. At the peak of the epidemic in 
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2000, the southern countries of Botswana and Swaziland experienced HIV prevalence rates of 
26% and 22.3%, respectively, whereas the HIV prevalence rate was 1% or less in the northern 
countries of Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, and Senegal (World Bank, 2013).  
Initially, the African HIV/AIDS epidemic was met with unresponsiveness both regionally 
and globally (AVERT, 2013). Little was known about the virus, and African governments were 
not only weak but faced more immediate political problems including civil war (Lewis, 2006). 
Moreover, the taboo sexual nature of HIV/AIDS transmission created stigmas that resulted in 
rejection and censure of scientific evidence by some African leaders (Denis, 2006). For example, 
in Zimbabwe, doctors were not permitted to reference AIDS on death certificates. Also, under 
President Mobutu, press members in the Congo were prohibited from publicly discussing AIDS 
until 1987 (AVERT, 2013).  
The worsening of the crisis in the 1990s forced countries to make the issue a national 
priority (Carael, 2006). Globally, the world responded with the creation of UNAIDS in 1995 as a 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and began to take an active role in assisting the 
Sub-Saharan African region (UNAIDS, 2013).    
Currently, there is an antiretroviral treatment that can be administered to patients daily to 
allow HIV patients to live longer. Antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) are not a cure for HIV/AIDS, but 
they slow the progression of HIV to AIDS permitting patients to live relatively normal lives 
(AVERT, 2012). While the cost of the treatment was prohibitively high when it was first 
introduced in 1996, over time, as a result of the introduction of generic versions, price 
competition, and pressure from organizations, the treatment for an individual is now available at 
a cost of $64 per year--or 18¢ a day.  
Despite the decline in the cost for ARVs and great strides made in its availability, 
currently, only 49% of Africans infected with HIV are receiving the treatment (AVERT, 2012). 
This is a reflection of sub-Saharan Africa as among the poorest regions of the world. According 
to the World Bank, in 2008, 47.5% of the sub-Saharan African population was living on $1.25 a 
day, and 69.2% of the population was living on $2 a day (World Bank, 2012). In 2012, the sub-
Saharan GDP per capita was $1,433 in comparison to the United States’ GDP per capita of 
$49,965 (World Bank, 2013).  
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The antiretroviral treatment is not a cure for HIV/AIDS, nor is such treatment universally 
available, so preventive measures offer the most effective means for addressing the epidemic. 
One of the goals of this study is to trace the cultural channels of the infection from the 
knowledge of the proximate causes. Direct HIV transmission results from shared bodily fluids 
during birth, breast-feeding, sexual intercourse, drug injection with shared equipment, or 
contaminated blood transfusions (Marlink and Kotin, p. 5). However, because “poverty in Africa 
precludes drug use” and homosexuality is uncommon in this region of the world, AIDS is chiefly 
transmitted through sex between men and women and, as a consequence, perinatally to infants 
(Fredland, 2001, p. 222). According to AVERT, there is a 15 to 45 percent chance of mother-to-
infant transmission from HIV-positive mothers (AVERT, 2014). This can be reduced to a rate of 
less than 5% by administering antiretroviral treatment, however, and significant improvements 
have been seen in recent years in a number of countries. Therefore, this study will focus on the 
adult population, where HIV prevalence is highest, and the reasons that some groups may be 
more or less likely to expose themselves to the kind of contact that would put them at risk for 
acquiring HIV.  
 
2.3 Previous Studies of HIV/AIDS and Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa 
There are only a handful of empirical studies on the relationship between religion and the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa. None of these studies are undertaken by 
economists. 
Gray (2004) reports that Muslim population shares are negatively related to HIV 
prevalence rates in sub-Saharan Africa. As potential explanations, he points to elements of the 
Islamic moral code: prohibitions on premarital and extramarital sex, as well as alcohol. Gray’s 
survey of a small number of country case studies also suggests that the Muslim practice of male 
circumcision may be important for hindering the virus’ spread. While Gray suggests underlying 
links between HIV prevalence and Islamic religious institutions, he presents no explicit evidence 
of their relevance or lack thereof.      
 In a study incorporating an array of economic, social, political, cultural, and regional 
factors as explanatory variables, Tiruneh (2009) concludes that interactions between religious 
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affiliation and other controls account for most of the variation in African adult HIV prevalence 
rates. He reports a significant positive correlation between southern Christian African countries 
and HIV rates, and a significant negative correlation between northern Islamic African countries 
and HIV rates. Tiruneh suggests that these results are indicative of more severe punishments for 
sexual transgressions within the Muslim cultures. Sharia law, which dictates Islamic moral code 
and religious law, allows for physical punishments including whipping and stoning. In contrast, 
while “Christianity prohibits pre- and extra marital sex, there is no legal enforcement to such 
practices” (Tiruneh, 2009, p. 116). Furthermore, commercial sex is most prevalent in the 
southern African countries that are predominantly Christian (Tiruneh, 2009, p. 116).5  
 Hargrove (2008) notes the lower rates of HIV prevalence in Muslim versus Christian 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. He reports evidence that circumcision rates are an important 
determinant of HIV prevalence but that controlling for them does not eliminate the significant, 
negative correlation between Muslim population share and HIV prevalence. He suggests that this 
may be due in part to the strong family coherence among the Muslim cultures that contrasts with 
the migratory work patterns of southern Africans who are predominantly Christian. However, 
Hargrove presents no explicit evidence on this hypothesis. Furthermore, the only additional 
controls that he includes are regional (West/Central, East, and South) dummy variables.       
 
2.4 Unbundling Religious Institutions 
Although the literature shows a link between Islam and decreased HIV/AIDS rates, the extant 
analyses of underlying institutional determinants are incomplete at best. In this paper we seek to 
explore a more comprehensive set of potentially relevant religious institutions.  
Both Christianity and Islam teach that followers should avoid sexual promiscuity, one of 
the most common channels of HIV transmission. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians counsels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  McIntosh and Thomas (2004) also explore economic and societal determinants of HIV prevalence. However, they 
study a broader cross-country sample (which does, of course, include sub-Saharan Africa). They also report that 
predominantly Muslim countries had lower prevalence rates. However, they also find that Orthodox Christianity 
also negatively correlates with the prevalence of HIV infection. Drain et al. (2004) explore a large number of 
socioeconomic determinants for 122 developing countries. However their results are almost exclusively from 
univariate regressions and are therefore difficult to interpret.	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Christians to “flee from sexual immorality” (1 Corinthians 6: 18); likewise, a passage from the 
Qur’an warns that one should “not approach unlawful sexual intercourse” (Qur’an: Surat Al-
‘Isra’ 17:32). Despite these clear commands, unsafe heterosexual relations remain the prominent 
means of transmission of the epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa (de Waal, 2006, p. 60; Fredland, 
2001, p. 222). Therefore we elaborate on institutions that may affect either the probability of 
unsafe contact or the probability that unsafe contact transmits the HIV virus.  
  
2.4.1 Male Circumcision  
Since the 1980s, scientists have hypothesized that male circumcision decreases the risk of HIV 
transmission, and recent medical studies have provided supporting evidence.  Clinical trials in 
South Africa, Uganda, and Kenya have shown that circumcision reduces men’s risk of sexual 
HIV transmission by approximately 50 percent and up to 60 percent (AIDS Vaccine Advocacy 
Coalition 2007).  It is hypothesized that removal of the male foreskin eliminates a concentrated 
area of cells that are targeted by HIV in the early stages of infection. Furthermore, circumcision 
may reduce the likelihood of genital ulcers as an HIV risk factor, and the procedure eliminates 
the possibility that small tears in the foreskin will make it easier for the virus to enter the body 
(Morris and Wamai, 2012).  
Although the Qur’an does not explicitly require circumcision of males, Muslims are the 
largest single religious group to traditionally circumcise males (Rizvi et al., 2009). Circumcision 
evolved as a ritual for cleanliness, but it has since become intrinsically incorporated into Islamic 
culture as an initiation into the Muslim faith (Morse, 2002). Depending on the family, region, 
and country, circumcision may be performed symbolically at various landmarks in a Muslim 
boys’ youth: on the seventh day after birth, at the age of seven, after being able to recite the 
entire Qur’an, or during puberty. Muslim support for the practice has been strengthened by 
evidence suggesting it is effective as a preventive measure against infection and disease (BBC, 
2009). 
 Of course, circumcision does not offer 100% protection against HIV infection (Bonner, 
2001). Furthermore, the association between circumcision and decreased infection has led to the 
concern that circumcision “might substitute, tragically, for other efforts such as condom use and 
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behavioral modifications” (Silverman, 2004, p. 427). However, the practice of male circumcision 
in Muslim communities predates the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Therefore, circumcision rates can be 
reasonably taken as exogenous potential determinants of prevalence rates. 
The role of Muslim circumcision draws a significant distinction from Christian cultures 
in the Sub-Saharan African region. Whereas Muslims continue to practice this time-honored 
tradition, male circumcision is not nearly as prominent within the Christian populations of Africa 
(Williams et al., 2006). Furthermore, some Christian missionaries have attempted to end the 
tradition of circumcision because the rites “were bound up with so much ‘pagan’ culture” 
(Becker, 2007, p. 26).  
 
2.4.2 Regulation of Religious Mores  
Another factor that has been suggested as a link to lower HIV prevalence rates in Muslim 
populations is the institution of Sharia (Islamic) Law (Tiruneh, 2009). In contrast to the pursuit 
of a secular government, “Muslims believe the separation of religion and state lead to moral 
decadence in society, therefore only Sharia, divine injunctions and positive law, can curb moral 
decline” (Sindima, 1998, p. 152). Consequently, the Islamic worldview holds that religious law 
should become the state law. Muslims uphold traditional values forbidding fornication, and 
trespassers are subject to punishments specified by the Qur’an. Clearly, this creates a greater 
incentive to follow Islamic moral code that is not present in many Christian communities. The 
decrease in promiscuous behavior may contribute to the lower prevalence of HIV.  
 Aside from the threat of physical and judicial enforcement, it is possible that some 
religious communities are more effective at enforcing their religious sexual rules than others by 
means of a socially perceived obligation or peer pressure. A religious community with the ability 
to influence the behavior of both members (and non-members) may effectively impact the 
prevalence of religious sexual transgressions. For this reason, a stricter or more conservative 




2.4.3 Condom Use 
The use of condoms is a specific and straightforward means of preventing the spread of HIV. 
Traditionally, the Catholic Church has been outspoken in its opposition to the use of condoms to 
control the spread of HIV (Benagiano et al., 2011). However, condom usage has also been 
passionately debated within Islamic communities, and Muslim clerics and leaders have led 
campaigns against the promotion of condoms (Moszynski, 2008). Nevertheless, several sub-
Saharan country governments have adopted the AIDS/HIV prevention slogan: “ABC: 
Abstinence, Be Faithful, and Use a Condom” and have seen considerable increases in condom 
use according to the United Nations Population Fund (Deegan, 2009, p. 138). UNAIDS, 
UNFPA, and WHO have released the official position statement that “the male latex condom is 
the single, most efficient, available technology to reduce the sexual transmission of HIV” 
(UNAIDS, 2009). However, some experts argue that “consistent condom use has not reached a 
sufficiently high level . . . to produce a measurable slowing of new infections in the generalized 




Accepted wisdom warns that alcohol in excess lowers inhibitions and may lead to risky behavior 
including unsafe sex. Heavy episodic drinking is higher in Africa than anywhere else in the 
world (WHO, 2011, p. 16). Furthermore, crime statistics from South Africa indicate that alcohol 
plays an important role in the occurrence of rape. In 1996, according to the Crime Information 
Centre, alcohol or drugs played a role in over 25% of reported rape cases in the Western Cape 
and in 36% of those in the Northern Cape of South Africa (Deegan, 2009, p. 97).  
 Northern Africa tells a different story about the consumption of alcohol, however. Strict 
adherents of the Muslim faith abstain from alcohol as the Qur’an asserts that “intoxicants . . . are 
but defilement from the work of Satan” (Qur’an; Surat Al-Maidah 5:90). Globally, abstention 
from alcohol is highest in the Northern African Muslim countries (WHO, 2011). In our sample 
of sub-Saharan African countries (see section 5 below) the pairwise correlation between Muslim 
13 
	  
population shares and alcohol consumption per capita is -0.0405 and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  
   
2.5 Data 
We construct a panel for up to 43 sub-Saharan African countries where average HIV prevalence 
is recorded for two periods: 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. The dependent variable of interest is the 
(log) HIV_PREVALENCE rate (UNAIDS & WHO’s Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic).  
  Average CHRISTIAN and MUSLIM population shares for the two periods are based on 
the available 1990-2009 yearly estimates from the CIA Factbook. We also consider the 
alternative measures reported in La Porta, et al. (1999). These measures are based on data going 
back to 1980 and do not give us any variation across the two time periods of our panel. However, 
they allow us to decompose Christianity into protestant (PROTESTANT_LLSV) and Catholic 
(CATHOLIC_LLSV) shares. Since the religious composition of a population often varies slowly, 
being able to make the distinction between protestant and Catholic populations might be worth 
that cost.   
We consider four variables as proxies for relevant religious institutions. The first of these 
is adult (15+ years) ALCOHOL yearly consumption per capita. This data are from the WHO and 
we use 1990-2000 and 2000-2008 averages. That being stated, we expect ALCOHOL to be 
associated with unsafe sexual behavior and, therefore, positively related to HIV_PREVALENCE.  
For the remainder of our institutional variables, we unfortunately must rely entirely on 
cross-sectional variation. However, they all represent cultural practices that likely vary slowly 
over time. We consider MALE_CIRCUMCISION rates based on the 2003 estimates reported by 
Williams (2006). We expect that MALE_CIRCUMCISION decreases the likelihood of the virus 
spreading during sexual intercourse and, therefore, is negatively related to HIV_PREVALENCE.  
We employ an index of the social regulation of religion (SOC_REG_RELIGION) that is 
described in Grim and Finke (2006) and coded by Grim (2005). This index measures the 
“general social attitudes toward religion and the actions of social movements and religious 
institutions toward other religious groups, especially new, foreign, or minority religions” (Grim 
14 
	  
and Finke, 2006, p. 2). It is based on answers to 5 questions included in the surveys conducted by 
the US State Department for its International Religious Freedom Reports. Specifically, these 
questions gauge (a) societal attitudes toward other or nontraditional religions, (b) relations 
between different religious communities, (c) social attitudes to conversations about other 
religions, (d) whether attitudes and/or edicts of a clerical establishment discourage proselytizing, 
and (e) whether established religions attempt to shut out new religions. (See Grim (2005, ch. 3) 
for more detail.) We anticipate using this variable to capture the “religiosity” of a given country 
and the potential for social pressure to adhere to religious commands of the predominant faith, be 
it either Christian or Muslim. We expect that a “stricter” society will exhibit lower levels of 
HIV_PREVALENCE as a result of fewer risky sexual encounters. This variable is particularly 
relevant for Islamic populations with Sharia Law. We take the average of values reported for 
2001, 2003, and 2008. 
Finally, we include a variable measuring male CONDOM use as a percentage of the male 
population ages 15-24. This data comes from the World Bank, and we take the average yearly 
values available from 1990-2009. While the data span both the 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 time 
periods of our panel, the reporting for individual years is sparse and idiosyncratic across 
countries.6 Therefore we treat CONDOM as fixed across time periods. Our prior is that condom 
use will impact HIV_PREVALENCE negatively. However, it is also possible that condom use 
decreases the perceived riskiness of sexual intercourse and leads to a more than offsetting 
increase in intercourse. In that case the effect on the spread of HIV could be positive.  
 For additional controls we begin by following Gray (2004) and consider population 
density (POP_DENSITY), the urban population share (URBAN), GDP per capita (GDP_PC), and 
year of a country’s first recorded AIDS (FIRST_CASE). Intuition might at first suggest that 
POP_DENSITY and URBAN are negatively related to HIV_PREVALENCE. Both variables are 
positively related to the number of people that a given individual can expect to come into contact 
with. However, The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations reports that 
AIDS is increasingly becoming a greater threat in rural areas than cities (FAO, 2013). According 
to FAO, “many urban dwellers and migrant labourers return to their village of origin when they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For examples, Benin only has a recorded observation for 2001 (31.7%); Ghana has recorded observations for 1998 
(31%), 2003 (44.5%), and 2008 (40.1%); Liberia has a single recorded observation for 2007 (18.6%). 
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fall ill” (FAO, 2013). Similarly, while there are numerous reasons to think that GDP_PC 
correlates negatively with HIV_PREVALENCE (e.g., higher incomes are associated with more 
education about the nature of HIV, its transmission, and its prevention) there may actually be a 
higher rate of risky sexual contact amongst the wealthy. This may be related to the fact that the 
wealthy tend to have better access to health care and therefore, all else equal, perceive infection 
as less costly. Indeed, existing studies report a positive correlation between HIV and income and 
wealth (Mishra et al. (2007) and Shelton et al. (2005)). Additionally, we include the LATITUDE 
of a country’s geographic center to account for the stark contrast in HIV prevalence between 
Northern and Southern Africa (Hargrove, 2008 and Tiruneh, 2009).  
 Summary statistics, descriptions, and sources for all of the above variables are provided 
in table 2. Table 3 then provides a correlation matrix for the HIV prevalence, religion, and 
institutional variables. Unsurprisingly, CHRISTIAN (MUSLIM) correlates positively (negatively) 
with HIV_PREVALENCE. Also, three of the institutional variables (CIRCUMCISION, 
ALCOHOL, and SOC_REG_RELIGION) have the expected correlation with 
HIV_PREVALENCE (negative, positive, and negative, respectively). However, CONDOM’s 
pairwise correlation with HIV_PREVALENCE is positive (0.54). Without putting too much stock 
in a simple pairwise correlation, this is consistent with the availability of condoms increasing the 
quantity of sexual intercourse demanded and/or the misuse or ineffectiveness of condoms in 
preventing HIV transmission. (As it turns out, CONDOM is not a statistically significant 
correlate once other variables are controlled for – see below in section 6.) 
 
2.6 Empirical Analysis  
In this section we report the results of regression analyses. We first explore the associations 
between HIV prevalence and religious affiliations in our 1990-2010 panel of sub-Saharan 
African countries. Once we establish the religion/prevalence partial correlations that are robust to 
our control variable set (table 4), we proceed to an analogous exercise using our institutional 
variables (table 5). Since we are interested in what underlying institutions drive the negative 
(positive) correlations between Muslim (Christian) affiliation and HIV prevalence, we explore 
whether or not the inclusion of particular institutional variables renders religious affiliation 




2.6.1  Religious Affiliation and HIV Prevalence 
We first consider the empirical relationships between religious affiliation and HIV prevalence. 
All variables enter regressions in natural log form. In the case of religious affiliations, we add 
one to variables before taking logs to avoid problems with observations of zero. Table 4 reports 
the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the log HIV prevalence rate on 
religious affiliation along with our control variables. Columns (1) and (2) use the religion 
variables obtained from the more recent CIA Factbook data with and without period fixed effects 
respectively. These results establish that the expected positive and significant (at the 1% level) 
relationship between CHRISTIAN and HIV_PREVALENCE is robust to including MUSLIM and 
the additional control variables. A 1% increase in a country’s Christian population share is 
associated with, all else equal, an increase in the HIV positive population share of about 0.4%. 
(This is true whether or not period fixed effects are included. The redundancy of these effects, in 
any case, cannot be rejected.) To put this in perspective, the sample mean of CHRISTIAN is 
about 37 percent. Starting from that mean, a 10 percentage point increase in CHRISTIAN is about 
a 27% increase. This would be associated with an increase in HIV_PREVALNCE of about 11 
percentage points. Alternatively, the coefficient estimate on MUSLM is actually positive when 
CHIRISTIAN is controlled for, but it is both small and insignificant. (This is also true with and 
without period fixed effects.) 
 Columns (3) and (4) are analogous to columns (1) and (2) except that they report 
regressions that substitute the La Porta et al. (1999) data for the CIA Factbook data on religious 
affiliation. While the coefficients on CHRISTIAN_LLSV are smaller than those reported based on 
CHRISTIAN, the results for religious affiliation are not qualitatively changed. The La Porta et al. 
(1999) data allows us to further differentiate Christians as either protestant or Catholic (columns 
(5) and (6)). Apparently it is the protestant population share (PROTESTANT_LLSV) that drives 
the significant relationship between HIV prevalence and Christianity in the sub-Saharan country 
sample. At face value this might suggest that Catholicism’s antagonism towards condom use is 
not a driving factor. If Catholic antagonism towards condom use was driving the positive 
Christian affiliation/prevalence relationship, we would expect CATHOLIC_LLSV to be itself 
positive and significant in the regressions. That the protestant population share seems to matter 
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more is an interesting puzzle, and one about which we can only speculate. One possibility is that 
British and Dutch colonizers in the south of Africa brought both their (predominantly protestant) 
religion as well as other institutional changes (e.g., production patterns that put stress on 
indigenous family structures). However, column (7) reports results analogous to those contained 
in column (5) except that we also include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country 
was ever a British or Dutch colony. Not only does that dummy not enter significantly; the 
coefficient on PROTESTANT_LLSV is virtually unchanged, both in terms of size and statistical 
significance.  
 Turning to the remaining control variables, both POP_DENSITY and URBAN are 
negatively correlated with HIV prevalence. This is contrary to our priors. Also, the simple 
pairwise correlations between each of these variables and HIV_PREV are both negative. This is 
consistent with findings of the FAO (2013) and Gray’s (2004) estimates for the effects of these 
variables are also negative (though not significant). Per capita GDP and the HIV prevalence rate 
are also positively correlated, consistent with the studies of Mishra et al. (2007) and Shelton et 
al. (2005). Gray (2004) also reports a similar positive and significant effect for sub-Saharan 
African countries and, though insignificant, McIntosh and Thomas (2004) estimate an effect of 
the same sign for a broader sample of countries. The signs of these effects maintain throughout 
other regressions reported below. We also note that the farther a country is from the equator, all 
else equal, the higher its HIV prevalence rate. Although these variables are not the focus of our 
study, the partial correlations associated with them may be a fruitful subject of further studies. 
The remaining control variable consistently has estimated effects that are consistent with 
our priors and statistically significant. The later a country’s first reported case of AIDS, the 
lower the HIV prevalence rate. In other words, all else equal, the later on the scene HIV appears, 
the less time it has had to increase in prevalence.   
 
2.6.2  Cultural Institutions and HIV Prevalence 
Next we estimate models that relate the (log) HIV prevalence rate to variables that proxy for 
institutions associated with religious affiliations. The results are contained in table 5. 
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Column (1) includes as regressors only the four institutional variables: ALCOHOL, 
MALE_CIRCUMCISION, SOC_REG_RELIGION, and CONDOM. While the social regulation of 
religion index does not enter significantly, the other three institutional variables do. ALCOHOL, 
in line with our prior expectation, enters positively and significantly, though only at the 10% 
level. MALE_CIRCUMCISION also has the expected negative estimated effect which is 
significant at the 1% level. These estimated effects are consistent with alcohol consumption 
impairing individuals’ judgments regarding risky activities and male circumcision decreasing the 
likelihood of HIV transmission during sexual contact. Alternatively, CONDOM enters positively 
and significantly, which is surprising to us. A positive effect is consistent with the availability 
and acceptability of condoms increasing the demand for risky sexual activity to an extent that 
trumps the decreased likelihood of HIV transmission during “safe” sex.  
However, amongst our proxies for institutions, we note that CONDOM is the most likely 
to be plagued by measurement error and/or reverse causality. First, CONDOM is based on self-
reporting. Since, in many cultures, reporting on one’s use of condoms is likely more 
embarrassing than reporting on, say, one’s alcohol consumption, the possibility for systematic 
measurement error is particularly severe. Also, CONDOM has no time variation and is 
constructed from averaging over observations that are idiosyncratically available for the years 
1990-2010. (See section 5 above.) Unlike, say, the social regulation of religion, it is quite 
plausible that observation on higher condom use were caused by programmatic responses to high 
HIV rates. For example, the highest observed value of CONDOM is 71.5% for Namibia. For the 
years 1990-2000 the average rate of HIV prevalence for Namibia is 7.72%; very high (though 
not the highest in our sample). In 1996, the Youth Health Development Program (YHDP) was 
established in Namibia to promote, among other things, greater use of condoms (Fitzgerald et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, the 2000-2010 average HIV prevalence for Namibia rose to 15.24%! Surely 
the initially high HIV prevalence rate played a role in determining the policy response. However, 
whether the subsequent increase in HIV prevalence was in part caused by or despite of the 
YHDP and other efforts is difficult to determine based on our data.7 Another potential problem in 
interpretation is measuring how condom use has changed over time (from one period to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Fitzgerald et al. (1999, p. 52) report that “[k]nowledge increased significantly among intervention compared to 




next), particularly with regards to the change in HIV prevalence between periods. In order to 
capture this time variation, we would need data from all countries from both periods; however, in 
some cases the only available measurement for a country comes from a single year. Without this 
variation, we cannot determine whether condom use is going up (down) over time and by how 
much. With these caveats, we note that in all subsequent regressions including CONDOM that 
we report, the coefficient estimate is always positive; it is also often statistically significant. 
Data availability on male condom use is quite limited relative to our sample and the 
column (1) regression includes only 29 countries. Therefore, column (2) reports a similar 
regression that drops CONDOM. This increases the number of countries to 40. However, the 
results for ALCOHOL and MALE_CIRCUMCISION are qualitatively unchanged and, while the 
point estimates both increase (from 0.244 to 0.397 for the former; from -0.445 to -0.378 for the 
latter) neither change in a statistically meaningful way.   
Columns (3) and (4) report regressions that include all four institutional variables along 
with our full control variable set (with and without period fixed effects, respectively). 
MALE_CIRCUMCISION still enters positively and significantly at the 1% level; the point 
estimates (-0.389 in both cases) are nearly identical to that reported in column (2) (-0.378). 
CONDOM does not enter significantly into either regression, nor does ALCOHOL. Recall, 
however, that ALCOHOL was only marginally significant (10% level) to begin with and that the 
inclusion of CONDOM diminishes the sample to include only 29 countries. When CONDOM is 
dropped (columns (5) and (6)) the coefficient point estimates on ALCOHOL remain essentially 
unchanged but regain their 10% level statistical significance. 
As a summary of the results form table 5, the evidence points most clearly towards the 
practice of male circumcision as having an important and negative impact on the spread of HIV 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The sample standard deviation of MALE_CIRCUMCISON is about 
31.6%. Taking the smallest point estimate (-0.314 from column (6)) starting from the sample 
mean level of HIV_PREVALENCE of about 5.25%, an increase of the male population that is 
circumcised from 0% to 31.5% would be associated with the rate of HIV prevalence falling, all 
else equal, from 5.25% to only 1.1%. To say that this particular quantitative example should be 
handled with care is a considerable understatement. However, the point of introducing it is to 
simply emphasize that the coefficient estimates suggest and quantitatively meaningful effect. 
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Alternatively, the evidence for an important ALCOHOL is much weaker and the coefficient 
estimates are quite small. (The sample standard deviation of ALCOHOL is only about 3.3 liters 
and the largest coefficient point estimate is 0.397.) CONDOM is rendered an insignificant 
correlate by the introduction of our control variable set; SOC_REG_RELIGON never enters 
significantly.    
 
2.6.3  Is Religious Affiliation Important Once Institutions are Controlled For? 
The results reported in tables 1 and 4 establish that while both Christian and Muslim population 
shares, taken individually, correlate significantly with HIV prevalence rates in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is the Christianity/HIV correlation that is robust to the inclusion of both the Muslim 
population share and a set of other control variables in a regression. We have also identified a set 
of variables that proxy for specific religious institutions that might drive the relationship between 
religious affiliation and HIV prevalence. The next logical step is to explore whether the 
affiliation/prevalence correlation is robust to controlling for these institutional variables.  
 The results from table 5 suggest that MALE_CIRCUMCISON and perhaps ALCOHOL 
are relevant. However, it is still possible that CONDOM and SOC_REG_RELIGON are 
important determinants that are just hard to identify given their collinearity with other variables. 
Likewise, it is also possible that the omission from the institutional variables from the table 4 
regressions leads to the statistical insignificance of MUSLIM. Therefore we report, in table 6, 
regressions that always include both CHRISTIAN and MUSLIM population shares, as well as the 
full set of control variables. We introduce each of the four institutional variables separately to see 
how the coefficient estimates on religious affiliation change. For example, we would be 
interested to know if introducing ALCOHOL consumption “knocks out” the statistical 
significance of CHRISTIAN. If it does, this may suggest that more Christianity is associated with 
greater HIV prevalence because Christianity (relative to other religions) tolerates/promotes 
greater consumption of alcohol (and the increased risky activity that goes along with it). (As it 
turns out, the results reported below do not support this particular story.) For each institutional 




 Across the eight columns of table 6 there are two immediately striking results: (i) 
CHRISTIAN always enters significantly (at the 5% level or better) regardless of the institutional 
variable that is controlled for and (ii) the coefficient estimate on MUSLIM remains statistically 
insignificant in all regressions. The institutional variables, taken individually, are always 
statistically significant, though only SOC_REG_RELIGON and MALE_CIRCUMCISION are 
significant at the 5% level or better. The estimated coefficient signs on the institutional variables 
are always in agreement with those reported in table 5. 
 Regardless of the institutional variable that is included, the CHRISTIAN population share 
not only enters statistically significantly but, also, the coefficient point estimate is remarkably 
stable. Across columns (1) through (8) the point estimate always falls in the 0.365 to 0.491 
range. These estimates cannot be statistically distinguished from one another, and they all 
represent quantitatively meaningful effects. (See the example in section 6.1 above that is given 
for a coefficient estimate of 0.418, right in the middle of the 0.365 to 0.491 range.)  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
We have analyzed a panel of up to 43 sub-Saharan countries covering the period from 1990 
through 2010. We have explored the relationships between HIV prevalence and religious 
affiliations; in particular, the Christian and Muslim population shares. We have then asked what 
institutions might underlie the HIV/religious affiliation relationships. The particular institutions 
that we consider are plausibly associated with the Christian and/or Muslim religions.  
 Here we summarize and discuss what we believe to be the interesting and important 
conclusions to be drawn from our results. 
• The prevalence of male circumcision has a large and negative effect on the spread of the 
HIV virus in sub-Saharan Africa. 
• Despite the conjectures of previous researchers that the practice of male circumcision 
links Muslim populations to lower HIV prevalence, we find that correlation not to be 
robust to controlling for the Christian population share even when the prevalence of male 
circumcision is not controlled for. 
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• The positive correlation between the Christian population share and HIV prevalence is 
robust to controlling for per capita alcohol consumption, male circumcision, condom use, 
and an index of the social regulation of religion. 
• Alcohol consumption may indeed have an intuitively plausible positive effect on risky 
sexual behavior and the spread of HIV, but the effect is quite small. 
• There is some evidence that condom use is associated with greater HIV prevalence, but 
issues of measurement error and reverse causation make interpretation of the estimated 
effects perilous. 
 
The robustness of Christian affiliation as a positive correlate with HIV prevalence in sub-
Saharan Africa is certainly an intriguing finding. Its robustness is not only to controlling for a 
country’s Muslim population share and our proxies for institutions; the Christian/HIV correlation 
is also robust to controlling for population density, the urban population shares, income per 
capita, the country’s latitude, and the date when a case of HIV was first reported. This suggests 
to us that there are religious institutions – perhaps informal behavioral norms – that are part of 
Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa and important determinants of the spread of HIV. 
Unfortunately, we are clearly not controlling for those other institutions. However, while a 
puzzle remains, a positive contribution of our paper is to cast doubt on some of the “usual 
suspects” (e.g., Catholic discouragement of condom use). 
 While we have also confirmed the important contribution of the practice of male 
circumcision for hindering HIV transmission, our findings call into question the link that 
previous researchers have made between the Muslim religion and lower HIV prevalence based 
on the practice. A particularly clear finding is that, controlling for the Christian population share, 
the Muslim population share does not significantly correlate with HIV prevalence in a country. 
Yet male circumcision itself is a robust correlate and is associated with large, negative estimated 
effects on HIV prevalence. We do not mean to deny the basic fact that Islamic tradition strongly 
encourages the circumcision of males. Rather, what is interesting is that male circumcision’s 
negative association with HIV prevalence does not align as straightforwardly as one would 
expect with a country’s Muslim population share. This could arise from particular methods of 
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male circumcision that are associated with particular Muslim groups and, as well, are particularly 
effective in hindering HIV transmission. It could also arise from particular complementary but 
unobserved institutions that correlate more strongly with male circumcision than with Muslim 
affiliation.  
 The positive association of reported condom use with HIV prevalence is troubling. Our 
prior is that it is largely a result of reverse rather than perverse causation. Still, it would be less 
troubling if the estimated effects were always small and statistically insignificant. Especially 
given variation in sub-Saharan African HIV prevalence over a 20 year period, one would hope 
that programs encouraging condom use yielded negative effects on the spread of the virus large 
enough to prevent positive and statistically significant correlations from manifesting. We are 
aware of no cross-country studies of Africa that propose an effective strategy to identify and 
report the true effects on increased condom use on HIV prevalence. Surely this is fruitful avenue 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Preliminary pooled regressions of (log) Sub-Saharan HIV rates on religious affiliation 




















    
F-statistic  - 31.372*** 
R2 0.383 0.329 0.436 
Countries 43 42 42 
Observations 86 84 84 
Notes: White HAC-consistent standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. F-statistic is for a test of joint 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: The Impact of Institutions on Health Outcomes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Which Ones Matter and Why  
 
3.1 Introduction  
	  
Rationally, the level of progress in the modern medical care field stipulates that infant mortality 
should be close to zero. Nevertheless, we see disturbingly high rates in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
2011, infant mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa was higher than any other region worldwide at 70 
deaths per 1,000 live births (World Bank, 2014). In comparison, high-income countries saw only 
5 deaths per 1,000 live births (World Bank, 2014). Similarly, life expectancy in sub-Saharan 
Africa noticeably contrasts with that of the U.S. In 2011, life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa 
was 56 years compared to 78.6 years in the U.S. (World Bank, 2014). In that same year, seven 
sub-Saharan African countries had average life expectancies less than 50 years of age.  
Evidence from the literature suggests that institutions may play a role in improving health 
outcomes by reducing the high infant mortality rates and increasing life expectancy in this 
region. Broadly, institutions are the “constraints that shape human interaction” and “structure 
incentives in human exchange,” and as such, a number of studies have investigated the role of 
institutional elements on outcomes of human welfare, specifically in extending life (North, 1990, 
p. 3). Boettke and Subrik (2003) found that the rule of law allows for increases in the level of 
development, which, as a consequence, translate into an increased life expectancy. Baliamounte-
Lutz (2009) showed that improvements in institutional quality led to increases in literacy and life 
expectancy, specifically in Africa, using both variables to indicate levels of human well-being. In 
another study, Knowles and Owens (2010) distinguish between “formal” and “informal” 
institutions then show that both types of institutions have a positive and significant impact on life 
expectancy. Finally, Moser and Ichida (2001) concluded that, for a given income level in African 
countries, higher institutional quality and individual freedoms reduce infant mortality.  
However, institutions span a wide spectrum of economic and political contexts within a 
society. Moreover, there is a sharp divide between public choice and neoclassical theory 
regarding the relationship, and possibly the preeminence, of economic to political freedom, or 
vice versa, in contributing to human welfare. Public choice economics emphasizes the 
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superiority of market to political allocations in fulfilling individual wants. Economic agents 
make decisions by maximizing utility functions that express individualized preferences given the 
constraints of limited resources. Outcomes are not contingent upon the will of the majority 
(Buchanan 1954).  Following this approach, empirical studies have linked economic freedom 
with increased life expectancy (Goldsmith 1997; Gwartney, Lawson, Holcombe 1999; Stroup 
2006; Williamson 2008).  
On the other hand, neoclassical economics support a leading role for political freedom in 
the form of democracy. Wittman (1989) argues that “democratic political markets are organized 
to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes” and are comparable to economic markets in terms of 
efficiency. Stiglitz (2002) calls for democratic governments to correct for economic market 
failures. Democratic political institutions have been positively associated with increases in life 
expectancy (Moser & Ichida 2001), and Kudamatsu (2007) found a negative relationship 
between democratization and infant mortality.  
The first question to ask is what kinds of institutions (political or economic) affect health 
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. I begin by examining and comparing the broad measures of 
democracy and economic freedom on health outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. The next question 
that can be asked is why either political or economic institutions should be expected to affect 
health outcomes. Therefore, after comparing broad measures of these institutions, I will further 
decompose institutions into their sub-components to better understand the nature of the 
relationship between institutions and health in countries in this region.  
As an extension, I create an interaction procedure intended to produce evidence of how 
these more specific channels of freedom impact the resources in a given country. If institutions 
are the “rules” of society, it can be expected that these rules affect the way resources are utilized 
in a that society and thus influence outcomes. Specifically, I look at the case of how economic 
freedom may interact with increased water access to affect health. To my knowledge, no other 
study has examined the role of specific channels of institutions and how these channels may 
affect health in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This paper is arranged as follows: in section 2, I examine the measures of institutional 
freedom and establish the decomposition of the comprehensive indices into their root 
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components. I also introduce the control variables that will be used. Section 3 sets up the model 
to be used in this study, and section 4 reports the results. The extension example is explored in 
section 5, and conclusions are drawn in section 6.  
 
3.2 Data 
In this paper, I examine a panel data set for up to 43 sub-Saharan African countries over 6 
periods: 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009. Caselli, 
Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) advocate the use of panel-data as a means of correcting for the 
shortcomings of cross-sectional data including the endogeneity of “flow” elements and the 
absence of the individual effect. Splitting the data into sub-periods of five years captures the time 
series information for the study, and the panel format can be adapted to correct for potential 
serial correlation. Using 5-year averages instead of annual variation helps to estimate a measure 
for variables (such as GDP), which may fluctuate from year to year (due to normal business 
cycles, etc) but still can be expected to fall in a particular range of values relative to the other 
countries. Furthermore, the institutional variables are expected to be slow-moving, so I am more 
interested in the change in institutional quality over a period of at least five years than from one 
year to the next. The dependent variables of interest are INFANT_MORTALITY, measuring the 
number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year and 
LIFE_EXPECTANCY, indicating the number of years a newborn infant would live if current 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth remained constant throughout its life  (World Bank, 
2014).  
The motivation for this paper is to investigate the effect of institutions on infant mortality 
and life expectancy; therefore, it is essential to employ measures that will most accurately reflect 
this relationship. Institutions are inherently difficult to measure since they represent qualitative 
data. Nevertheless, assessments of institutions have been captured in widely accepted indices. 
The Polity IV Project data set has produced an index (DEM_POLITY) to evaluate the level of 
institutionalized democracy in a country. The eleven-point scale (0-10) draws on three sub-
indices: the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.  
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Likewise, economic institutions are measured by an aggregate index, which can be 
broken down into its component indices. The Economic Freedom of the World Index produced 
by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2012) is composed of five major areas: size of government 
(SIZE_GOVT), legal structure and security of property rights (LEGAL_PROPERTY), access to 
sound money (SOUND_MONEY), freedom to trade internationally (TRADE_FREEDOM), and 
regulation of credit, labor, and business (REGULATION). Each of these indices are based on a 
scale of 1 to 10 with 10 denoting countries with freer, less obstructed markets (each variable is 
discussed in more detail in this section). They are reported at 5-year intervals from 1975 to 2000, 
and then on an annual basis from 2000 thereafter.  
The sub-index SIZE_GOVT captures four areas: government consumption, transfers and 
subsidies, government enterprises and investment, and the top marginal tax rate. A higher rating 
in this category denotes that a country operates with more personal choice but smaller overall 
government budgets and involvement. SOUND_MONEY incorporates money growth, inflation, 
and freedom to own foreign currency. A higher score indicates that a country exhibits low and 
stable rates of inflation and allows for the use of alternative currencies. The variable 
LEGAL_SYSTEM describes the strength of a country’s legal system and its respect for property 
rights. Specifically, this index accounts for judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of 
property rights, military interference in rule of law and politics, integrity of the legal system, 
legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property, reliability of 
the police, and business costs of crime. REGULATION describes the extent of regulations that 
exist in credit markets, labor markets, and for businesses. The final economic variable is 
TRADE_FREEDOM. The freedom to trade internationally incorporates the impact of tariffs, 
regulatory trade barriers, black-market exchange rates, and controls of the movement of capital 
and people. A high rating on this sub-index indicates that a country facilitates international trade 
with low tariffs and few impediments to movement across international borders. In all of these 
areas, a higher score indicates more economic freedom and will be referenced in this context 
throughout the paper.  
Why might we expect higher levels of economic freedom to play a role in better (or 
worse) health outcomes? Theoretically and empirically, the literature is mixed. Free trade not 
only increases potential for material welfare through physical imports, but Owen and Wu (2007) 
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suggest that open international borders may allow for knowledge spillovers including in the 
health field. In their study, a country’s openness to international trade is positively associated 
with improved health of the population: a higher life expectancy and a lower infant mortality. 
Stroup (2007) points to Friedman’s contention that a stable money supply allows the market 
price system to effectively convey relevant market information. When inflation affects price 
signals, there is a distortion in the flow of information (Friedman 1980). This could potentially 
obstruct access to health care. Tracy, et al. (2010) find that improved property rights and access 
to sound money are associated with lower child mortality. They suggest that without a stable 
currency, high inflation rates have the potential to destroy household savings thus creating 
vulnerability if family members fall ill. In a similar manner, better protection of property may 
offer families an additional means of collateral in case of unforeseen health problems. With 
regard to the size and involvement of a government, increased regulation and higher taxation is 
associated with an interventionist government and less economic freedom. Increased state-
intervention offers more opportunities for bureaucratic delay and corruption, which could impede 
health service delivery or shift investment away from high value projects including health 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  
On the other hand, certain areas of economic freedom may either have no effect on health 
or may actually cause worse outcomes. Tracy, et al. (2010) study the empirical impact of the five 
economic sub-areas on health outcomes internationally and find that only improved property 
rights and access to sound money are associated with lower child mortality but can make no 
other connections between the economic sub-areas and better health in other areas. Fafchamps 
(2004) suggests that legal institutions may matter little in African nations where poor economies 
make “most market transactions . . . too small to justify court action and most people have no 
assets to foreclose upon” (Fafchamps 2006, p. 1184). A main finding from La Porta, et al. (1999) 
is that countries with smaller governments and lower tax collection actually perform worse than 
countries with larger governments. Smaller governments may lack the structure to collect taxes, 
and self-interested or corrupt officials may not concern themselves with the needs of 
constituents. Consequently, these countries may suffer as a result of poor provision of public 
goods. Similarly, Rauch and Evans (2000) argue that it is the quality of bureaucracy that affects 
effectiveness of government.  
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The goal of this paper is to examine whether these areas of economic freedom play a 
positive or negative role in health outcomes specifically in sub-Saharan Africa; something that, 
to my knowledge, has not yet been done in the literature. In the best-fit OLS regression lines of 
Figure 1, a negative correlation between the economic freedom and infant mortality is 
observable (fewer infant deaths as economic freedom increases). Likewise, we see the same 
relationship with the measure of democracy and infant mortality (albeit, the relationship is less 
pronounced than with economic freedom). These relationships are reversed when looking at life 
expectancy as the dependent variable, indicating that political and economic institutions are 
associated with improved health outcomes in both cases. Table 1 reports that, after producing the 
bivariate regression results, the coefficient estimates of democracy and economic freedom are 
negatively related to infant mortality and statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Likewise, both are positively related to life expectancy. Thus, as a result of this initial inspection 
and evidence from the literature discussed in the introduction, I proceed with the prior that the 
institutions will be associated with improved health outcomes.  
Additional controls are based on the literature on life expectancy and infant mortality in 
developing countries, and specifically, sub-Saharan Africa. A review of the literature shows that 
the variables used in empirically examining the determinants of both life expectancy and infant 
mortality are fundamentally similar. However the controls are expected to exert opposite effects 
on infant mortality and life expectancy as decreased infant mortality represents an improved 
health outcome while increased life expectancy represents an improved health outcome. Nearly 
all of the reviewed literature incorporates a measure for income or wealth as a determinant of 
infant mortality and life expectancy (Arik and Arik 2009, Fayissa 2001, Imam and Koch 2004, 
Kembo and Van Ginneken 2009, Omariba et al. 2007, Pamuk et al. 2011, Kabir 2008, Husain 
2002).  A higher income indicates a higher level of development within a country, and 
consequently, these studies have found infant mortality to be inversely related to GDP per capita 
while life expectancy is positively associated with GDP per capita.8 I expect similar findings in 
this study using the variable GDPPC from the World Bank.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A portion of the literature discusses the issue of potential endogeneity between life expectancy and GDP per capita 
(Pritchett and Summers 1996). In other words, it may be difficult to disentangle the extent to which wealth extends 
life and the reverse effect of better health on the ability to be more productive.  To control for this, I include the 
variable lagged GDP per capita in the regression for life expectancy. As the results are quantitatively similar, they 
are not reported.  
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The intention of health care spending is to extend life and reduce mortality. This would 
create a positive correlation between health spending and health outcomes. However, Fayissa 
and Gutema (2005) point out that countries with lower levels of health may allocate more money 
for health expenditures. Therefore it is also possible that health outcomes will be inversely 
associated with health expenditures. This study uses World Bank data on health expenditures per 
capita in current U.S. dollars to measure the sum of public and private health expenditures as a 
ratio of total population.  
Empirical studies by Imam and Koch (2004) and Pamuk, Fuchs, and Lutz (2011) found 
mother’s education and HIV prevalence rates to be among the most significant determinants of 
infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. A higher level of maternal education, all else equal, has 
been found to be negatively associated with infant mortality as it indicates a greater knowledge 
of health practices. Additionally, increased education among women decreases birth rates as 
these women tend to start families later than less educated women (Imam and Koch, 2004, p. 
26). Likewise, the literature shows that life expectancy is improved by education. Higher levels 
of education increase health knowledge allowing people to live healthier lives (Husain 2002, 
Kabir 2008). The literature specifically uses women’s education as a determinant of life 
expectancy as it affects women’s productivity and knowledge, which in turn has the capacity to 
positively impact family health. In this study, I use the average number of years of female 
education obtained from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation and anticipate an inverse 
relationship with infant mortality and a positive relationship with life expectancy.  
On the other hand, HIV prevalence, which is more severe in sub-Saharan Africa than 
anywhere else in the world, is consistently positively related to a higher infant mortality rate in 
these studies and negatively related to life expectancy. HIV-positive women are more likely to 
give birth to babies that suffer from complications of low birth-weight and inadequate nutrition 
(Noel, et al. 2008). Life expectancy is unquestionably adversely affected by HIV prevalence. It is 
estimated that in countries where HIV is most severe, life expectancy is 10-20 years shorter than 
in it would be otherwise (Kabir 2008). HIV prevalence in this study is obtained from World 
Bank figures.  
The final two controls are FERTILITY and WATER_ACCESS (World Bank, 2013). 
Higher fertility rates are characteristic of less developed countries and may indicate the absence 
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of family planning (Arik and Arik 2009). Studies have shown this variable to be positively 
related to infant mortality. Husain (2002) suggests that high fertility points towards increased 
births that may be closely spaced. This may have harmful effects on women or cause other birth 
complications, which may decrease average life expectancy and increase infant mortality.  
WATER_ACCESS is a variable that measures the percentage of the population with access to an 
improved water source (World Bank, 2013).  In the sub-Saharan African region, some countries 
are affected by household contamination, inadequate access to water, and poor sanitation—all 
factors which can lead to increased infant mortality and decreased life expectancy (Kembo and 
Van Ginneken 2009). For this reason, I expect increased access to safe water to be inversely 
related to infant mortality and positively related to life expectancy.  
Several of these studies additionally control for the urban/rural share of the population. It 
is expected that rural areas have less access to better health resources, nutrition and water 
increasing infant mortality rates and decreasing life expectancy. However, Pamuk, Fuchs, and 
Lutz (2011), find that “the rural disadvantage with respect to infant mortality is entirely 
eliminated” by controlling for education and economic composition of rural and urban areas 
(Pamuk, Fuchs, and Lutz, 2011, p. 657). Therefore, I do not include this among the controls. 
Table 2 lists the summary statistics, descriptions, and sources for the variables discussed above.  
 
3.3 Model 
This section establishes the approach to investigating the relative impact of political and 
economic institutions on health outcomes in the sub-Saharan African region. The initial part of 
this analysis compares the role of political and economic institutions in impacting life 
expectancy and infant mortality. The goal is to examine the broad measures of institutions and 
compare these results to the literature. A basic model can be written as: 
 
     (1) 
 
HEALTH _OUTCOME = !1(INSTITUTION )+! 2X +"
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where HEALTH_OUTCOME alternates as life expectancy and infant mortality, INSTITUTION 
indicates either political or economic freedom, X represents the set of controls, and ε is the error 
term. 
 First, however, it is critical to consider the nature of the data being studied. The sample of 
data comes from up to 43 sub-Saharan African countries suggesting that I may need to account 
for fixed effects. A Hausman test reveals that the (country) fixed effects model is superior to the 
random effects model with both life expectancy and infant mortality as the dependent variable.9 
The test for period-fixed effects indicates that time fixed effects should be included for the 
regressions with INFANT_MORTALITY (F statistic: 5.94, p-value: 0.0054). However when 
repeating the test for LIFE_EXPECTANCY, the null hypothesis that dummies for all years are 
zero cannot be rejected (F statistic: 1.62, p-value: 0.2109). Therefore, I do not include period-
fixed effects in the life expectancy regression. The results of the OLS fixed effects regressions 
are reported in Table 2 in columns (1) and (3).10   
 With a panel that spans from 1980 to 2005, the next concern to address is the possibility 
of serial correlation. In other words, it is likely that both dependent variables (life expectancy 
and infant mortality) are influenced by their own values in previous periods. Estimating OLS in 
the presence of autocorrelation may lead to inefficient estimates, underestimated standard errors, 
and an overestimated R2. Examining the residuals plotted against the lagged residuals for the 
each of the OLS regressions exposes an upward trend suggesting autocorrelation (See Figure 2). 
The presence of autocorrelation can be specifically tested using the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data. In both cases, the null hypothesis that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation is rejected (Infant mortality: F-statistic = 74.433, p-value = 0.000; Life 
expectancy: F-statistic = 26.302, p-value = 0.000).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 P-values of Hausman test less than 0.01 using life expectancy and infant mortality in the main specification.  
10	  Heteroskedasticity is tested using White’s test for heteroskedasticity. In the cases of infant mortality 
(χ2= 60.77, p-value= 0.0475) and life expectancy (χ2= 59.48, p-value= 0.0596), I reject the null hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity. Therefore, all of the regressions reported throughout this paper include robust 




 In order to correct for autocorrelation, I follow the GMM estimation designated by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). This approach creates estimators designed to deal with both 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by the transformation of regressors through differencing 
and then the use of generalized method of moments (Roodman 2009). In the process, the 
dependent variable is lagged and used in the estimation process. This corrects for the issue of 
autocorrelation. Additionally, by first-differencing the regressors, the fixed country-specific 
effect is removed as it does not vary with time (Mileva 2007). The Arellano-Bond methodology 
is intended for panels with few time periods and many individuals (“small T, large N”), and it 
utilizes “internal” instruments based on the lags of the regressors, which suits it well for my data 
set (Roodman 2009).  The results are reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. The results of 
the Arellano-Bond specification prove to be more conservative than the previous estimates 
(nevertheless, they still indicate that there are significant results). Consequently, I choose to 
continue the use of this approach for the next part of this study.11 12 
Having established a model to compare the overall relationship between economic and 
political institutions and health outcomes, I now turn to breaking down the Economic Freedom 
of the World index into its sub-indices in order to trace the more specific sources of this 
connection. One by one, I include each of the economic areas (SIZE_GOVT, SOUND_MONEY, 
TRADE_FREEDOM, LEGAL_SYSTEM, REGULATION) in the specification as the “institution” 
and evaluate the impact on health outcomes. These results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 and 
discussed in the following section.  
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The first goal of this study is to evaluate whether economic or political institutions, namely, 
economic freedom and democracy, are more effective in improving health outcomes. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The Hansen J statistic (used in robust estimations) reports the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are 
exogenous. This means that the higher the p-value the better. In all cases throughout this study, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.	  
12	  Across the specifications for both infant mortality and life expectancy, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation 
(H0: no autocorrelation) is applied to the differenced residuals. In all cases, it cannot be rejected providing no 
evidence for model misspecification.	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preliminary pooled regressions in Table 1 suggest that both may contribute to better health; in all 
regressions, both variables exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship with life 
expectancy and a negative and statistically significant association with infant mortality. This 
supports evidence found in the literature as discussed in the introduction. However, adding the 
controls into the analysis shows that democracy is no longer a significant determinant of life 
expectancy and infant mortality (Table 3). On the other hand, economic freedom is consistently 
related to better health outcomes across all specifications. Using the results from the Arellano-
Bond model (the most conservative estimates), a one standard deviation increase in economic 
freedom is associated with almost a one-year increase in life expectancy and a decrease of 3.5 
infant deaths per 1,000 births.  To provide perspective, one standard deviation separates Chad 
from Sierra Leone from Botswana in order of least economically free to most economically free.   
Turning to the controls used in the Table 3 regressions, the variables generally exhibit 
the expected sign discussed earlier. Using life expectancy as the dependent variable, 
HIV_PREVALENCE is consistently statistically significant and negatively related with life 
expectancy across all specifications. Likewise, GDPPC is positively associated with increased 
lifespan. It is feasible to see either sign on the variable FERTILITY: increased fertility may 
indicate a healthy population that is simultaneously seeing longer lifespans, but increased 
fertility could also be associated with lower life expectancies as developing countries are known 
for having higher birthrates. Looking at the controls for infant mortality, the only other 
statistically significant result in the Arellano-Bond estimation besides the economic freedom 
variable is HEALTH_EXPEND, which proves to be negatively related to infant mortality. This 
result shows that increased health expenditure decreases infant mortality.  
I now turn to Tables 4 and 5 to examine the results of a more specific decomposition of 
how economic freedom may affect health using the five sub-components of the index. Looking 
first at infant mortality as a health outcome (Table 4), there is only one sub-area of economic 
freedom that proves to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, a one standard deviation increase 
in SOUND_MONEY alone is related to a decrease of 3.2 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. 
Consistently across the regressions of Table 4, increased health expenditure is related to a 
decline in infant mortality, and increased HIV prevalence is associated with higher levels of 
infant mortality. It is also apparent from the lagged infant mortality variable that higher levels of 
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infant mortality in the past are associated with higher levels of infant mortality as in the future 
providing support for the GMM model choice.  
Table 5 reports the results when life expectancy is the dependent variable. In this case, 
all of the economic sub-areas prove to be statistically significant and positively related to life 
expectancy with the exception of the variable LEGAL_PROPERTY. In terms of magnitude, 
increased REGULATION is associated with the largest increase in life expectancy. One standard 
deviation increase in REGULATION equates to 1.2 additional years of life.  
When looking at the controls used in the model with infant mortality, the variables mirror 
the results for life expectancy in terms of improved health outcomes. Increased health 
expenditure is related to higher life expectancy while HIV prevalence is inversely related to life 
expectancy. Again, we can observe the positive coefficient on the lagged life expectancy 
variable. One new observation is the positive association between FERTILITY and life 
expectancy. According to this model, increased fertility relates to longer life expectancy.  
 
3.5 Extension 
The goal of this paper is to determine not only which institutions are significant for health in sub-
Saharan Africa, but also how these institutions improve health outcomes. By breaking the 
economic freedom index into its sub-areas, we can get a better idea of what types of institutions 
serve as the best conduits of better health: a sound money supply, fewer regulations, a less 
intrusive government, and freer trade. In this section, I intend to see if economic freedom 
variables interact with a given resource in society to accomplish relatively better outcomes than 
without the interaction. Specifically, I look at the control variable WATER_ACCESS for this 
procedure. Inadequate water provision in sub-Saharan Africa is a severe issue in many of the 
countries in this region. But, in most cases, this is not actually due to an absolute lack of water. 
According to UNDP 2006 Human Development Report, in the country of Tanzania, households 
in Moshi use an average of 5 gallons a day while wealthier residents of Dar es Salam use about 
45 gallons a day (UNDP 2006, p. 53). The report points to underlying issues of inequality as a 
result of divergent demographic access between the rich and the poor as the cause of insufficient 
water provision. Africans living in slums cannot connect to piped water as a utility but instead 
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rely on water provided by (often informal) intermediaries who charge much higher prices. For 
this reason, those “living in slums and low-income settlements typically pay 5-10 times or more 
for their water than high-income residents of the same city” (UNDP 2006, p. 52). 
In the following interaction procedure, I hope to uncover whether the simultaneous 
presence of a specific economic freedom and improved water access will allow for better health 
outcomes than either would by themselves. A generalized version of this model can be written 
as: 
 
INFANT _MORTALITY = !1(INSTITUTION )+! 2(WATER_ ACCESS)+! 3(INSTITUTION *WATER_ ACCESS)+! 4X +"   (2) 
 
The term INSTITUTION*WATER_ACCESS represents the interaction between the water access 
variable and the economic freedom sub-area while X represents the remaining control variables.  
The results are reported in Table 6 and 7. Two interaction variables prove to be 
statistically significant and inversely related to infant mortality: 
(SOUND_MONEY*WATER_ACCESS) and (SIZE_GOVT*WATER_ACCESS). In both cases, 
the coefficient on this interaction term indicates that the combination of improved water access 
and the respective economic freedom is more effective at reducing infant mortality than either 
variable is by itself. Although it is not statistically significant, WATER_ACCESS interacted with 
the other economic freedom areas carries a negative sign except when interacted with 
TRADE_FREEDOM.  
 One interesting result to note in particular is the large positive coefficient on SIZE_GOVT 
in column (1) of Table 6. It indicates that a one standard deviation increase in SIZE_GOVT is 
associated with nearly 19 more infant deaths per 1,000 births. Nevertheless, as previously 
discussed, the interaction term (SIZE_GOVT*WATER_ACCESS) in the same regression is 
statistically significant and negatively associated with infant mortality. This result is consistent 
with the findings of La Porta, et al (1999) that larger governments perform better than smaller 
governments. It is likely this can be explained by the issues related to the disparity in water 
prices between Africans who are linked to a municipal water network and those who must 
45 
	  
purchase water informally from vendors or other intermediaries. A higher score on SIZE_GOVT 
indicates smaller government transfers and subsidies, less government enterprises and 
investment, and a lower top marginal tax. This means that the government will be less involved 
in providing local utilities, including water, to its citizens. Therefore, residents have no other 
choice but to pay high informal prices for water by private providers, and consequently there are 
higher infant mortality rates. In the case of provision of public goods, a smaller size of 
government may actually hurt health outcomes by failing to meet basic needs more efficiently 
than citizens can individually. This is a situation where the government is precluded from 
intervening by providing a public good as a result of a limited tax base and limited ability to 
organize (Fafchamps 2006). On the other hand, the negative sign that is present on the term 
(SIZE_GOVT*WATER_ACCESS) may reveal that if a country has relatively improved water 




Using a panel of up to 43 sub-Saharan African countries over 6 periods from 1980 to 2009, I 
have considered the relative impact of economic versus political institutions on infant mortality 
rates and life expectancy. Furthermore, I have looked at the specific channels through which 
economic institutions may affect these health outcomes.  
 This study supports the finding that economic institutions are more beneficial in reducing 
infant mortality rate and increasing life expectancy than political institutions. Most specifically, I 
find that the areas of sound money, size of government, trade freedom, and regulation serve as 
the specific institutional conduits of improving heath outcomes. SOUND_MONEY, in particular, 
remains robust across all specifications and interacts with water access as a significant factor 
associated with reduced infant mortality. At the same time, the interaction of water access with 
different types of economic freedom indicates that the role of economic institutions may not be 
entirely straightforward. In the relative absence of certain resources, a more involved 
government may improve health outcomes by providing public goods and services. 
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 The difficulty of exploring institutions lies in the inherent difficulty of adequately 
capturing their effects. However, this study begins a journey to narrow broader economic 
freedom concepts and indices to specific areas that serve as the drivers of the improved health 
outcomes. Future research on this topic may delve into an even more detailed investigation of the 
role of specific sub-Saharan African policy or practices stemming from the soundness of money 
supply, regulations, openness of trade, and the size of government in a given country. 
Discovering more precise indicators and measurements will help eliminate the vagueness of 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 4: The Spatial Configuration of the Informal Sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Do Informal Markets Cross Borders? 
4.1 Introduction  
The emergence of an informal sector indicates relatively higher opportunity costs for businesses 
and individuals to operate within the formal economy of a given country. This shadow economy 
tends to arise in environments that are unfriendly to the creation and operation of legal 
businesses (De Soto 2000). The complexity and the magnitude of the tax system are frequently 
cited in the literature as determinants of informality (Schneider 2012, Ruge 2010, Benjamin and 
Mbaye 2012). Additionally, governments that are unable or unwilling to recognize the rule of 
law, and protect property and contracts specifically, make it exceedingly difficult for businesses 
to function successfully within the confines of the formal economy (Friedman et al. 2000). 
Therefore, a proliferating shadow economy can be a consequence of business climate, tax 
burden, general governance, and the state of the official economy, particularly its labor market. It 
is consistent, then, that “extralegality has become the norm” in developing economies where 
these issues are most pronounced  (De Soto 2000, p. 30). 
Globally, sub-Saharan Africa accommodates the largest share of informal markets. 
Estimations by Schneider, et al. (2010) show that regionally, sub-Saharan Africa has the largest 
shadow economy (as a percentage of “official” gross domestic product) with a median of 40.5 
percent as compared to OECD countries with a median of 16.0 percent. This assessment parallels 
this region’s poor record of governance, corruption, poverty, and business climate. According to 
the 2012 Ease of Doing Business index, sub-Saharan Africa ranked lowest as a region (World 
Bank, 2014). Sub-Saharan Africa scored a 2.7 out of 6 (1=low to 6 =high) on the CPIA index for 
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector as a consequence of its weak 
political and economic institutions (World Bank, 2014). In 2010, almost 50% of the sub-Saharan 
population was living on less than $1.25 day, and the average income per capita was just over 
$1,000 as compared to about $50,000 in the United States (World Bank, 2014). Examining these 
figures reveals a region where incentives are few to operate within the formal economy.  
 However, there is another factor that may contribute to the rampant increase of the 
shadow economies in sub-Saharan Africa, which has not yet been explored. This is the physical 
spatial configuration of black markets across the continent. As certain institutions strengthen or 
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weaken in one African country, the institutions of neighboring countries are likely affected. This, 
in turn, may impact the level of informal sector activity. In other words, the proliferation of the 
shadow economy in Sub-Saharan Africa may be a result, in part, of spatial spillovers.  
 In this paper, I propose a spatial approach to analyzing the emergence of informality in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Through the estimation of a spatial econometric model, this paper explores 
the extent to which black markets in one country “spill over” onto other neighboring countries, 
specifically through different institutional economic channels. This paper proceeds as follows: in 
section 2, there is more development of the relevant literature on institutions and spatial 
spillovers. Section 3 presents the data to be used for this paper while section 4 describes the 
spatial econometric model in which it will be used. The results of the model are reported and 
analyzed in section 5, and conclusions are drawn in the final section.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
It seems natural that proximity might create institution building among neighboring countries. 
This concept has been examined with particular regard to sub-Saharan Africa by Easterly and 
Levine (1998). They conclude that policy choices are contagious across borders and that growth 
resulting from effective policy changes is relatively larger when neighboring countries act 
together. Simmons and Elkins (2004) study the diffusion of liberal economic practices across 
international borders and find support that economic policies are transmitted through both the 
emulation of success as well as imitation induced by cultural ties. Using a spatial econometric 
model, Kelejian, Murrell, and Shepotylo (2013) similarly show that the level of institutions in a 
country’s immediate neighbors affects the country’s own institutions. They suggest that this 
diffusion occurs through “a variety of mechanisms” including learning, imperialism, and 
economic competition (Kelejian et al. 2013, p. 298). Ultimately, spatially-established institutions 
may influence the level of shadow economic activity that is observed across nations.   
The underground economy can be considered to be a type of corruption with the capacity 
to spill over from one nation to another. Therefore, the literature on corruption and the 
institutional channels by which it spreads are relevant for this discussion. Ortega, Florax, and 
Delbecq (2010) investigate the international spatial distribution of corruption and its economic 
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and political determinants. They conclude that the economic and political actions of a country 
significantly impact levels of corruption in surrounding countries. Similarly, Bonaglia, Macedo, 
and Bussolo (2001) look at the effect of globalization on governance. They reach the specific 
conclusion that import openness reduces corruption.  
Goel and Saunoris (2014) hypothesize that corruption and shadow economic activity may 
be both intertwined and contagious across national borders and present two possible scenarios 
for the link. On the one hand, corruption and the informal sector may be substitutes for one 
another in that informal firms may diminish rent-seeking opportunities for corrupt officials. The 
opposite view is that corruption and the informal sector may serve as complements when the 
black market firms and officials work cooperatively through bribery, support, and kickbacks. As 
a result of their study, they find evidence of spatial contagion between corruption and informality 
across borders with cross-contagion traced to substitution between own informality (corruption) 
and neighboring corruption (informality).  
The spatial approach taken by these papers underline a common assertion: the institutions 
of one country do not affect that country alone but instead have the potential to spill over onto 
neighboring countries. However, no other study has explored how the strength of economic 
institutions impact the spread of informality within this spatial framework. This study will 
additionally utilize the extensive shadow economy dataset recently developed by Elgin and 
Oztunali (2012).  
 
4.3 Data 
The concealed nature of black markets renders measurements of informal market activity 
difficult to fully capture with absolute confidence. However in order to engage in an empirical 
study of informal markets, it is necessary to establish some approximation, even if imperfect, of 
black market activity.  
Even in spite of the difficulty in obtaining such data, it is clear that informal markets 
comprise a significant part of economies worldwide (Schneider and Enste 2000). Globally, the 
shadow economy appears to be growing. In 2009, the OECD estimated that half of the workers 
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of the world were a part of the informal sector, and by 2020, it is expected that two-thirds of the 
world’s workers will be informal (Rabinowitz 2011). Observation of the rapidly growing sector 
worldwide has given rise to a new name for this phenomenon: “System D” (Neuwirth 2011). 
System D originated from the French word débrouillard, which refers to to a remarkably 
effective or motivated individual (Neuwirth 2011). Over time, the spirit of this word has been 
broadened to speak collectively of those “entrepreneurs” who have evaded the regulations and 
restrictions of government by leaving the official economy altogether.  Specifically in Africa, 
estimates by Schneider (2012) indicate that the average share of informal employment in total 
non-agricultural employment has increased steadily from 40% in the 1980s to over 60% in the 
2000s.  
There has been no consensus on the best way to approximate the size of the shadow 
economy; however there have been a several popular approaches. These attempts can be broadly 
categorized as the indirect, direct, and MIMIC approaches (Schneider 2012; Elgin and Oztunali 
2012). Indirect approaches utilize macroeconomic indicators as a proxy for “true” economic 
activity in contrast with the nationally reported GDP figures. For example, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) contend that the consumption of electricity represents all economic activity 
including informal activities unreported by official measures. By tracking the growth of 
electricity consumption, their paper establishes estimates for the size of the underground 
economy. Direct approaches to estimating the size of the informal economy include surveys, 
interviews, and questionnaires. The 2006-2007 Global Competitiveness Report released by the 
World Economic Forum provided underground economy figures as a result of the responses of 
top business leaders from 125 countries (World Economic Forum 2007). Finally, the MIMIC 
(multiple indicators multiple causes) approach has been popularized in recent years by Schneider 
(2012). Through this method, the shadow economy is considered to be an unobserved 
phenomenon (or latent variable) approximated by “using quantitatively measurable causes of 
illicit employment, e.g. tax burden and regulation intensity, and indicators reflecting illicit 
activities, e.g. currency demand, official GDP and official working time” (Schneider 2012).  
Assessments of the strength of the estimates produced by these methodologies indicate 
that problems may arise from the simplification of assumptions (indirect approach), 
measurement error (direct approach), and ad-hoc specifications without micro-foundations 
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(MIMIC) (Elgin and Oztunali 2012).  However, recently, a new approach pioneered by Elgin and 
Oztunali (2012) establishes a dynamic general equilibrium composed of the official and shadow 
economies. The model is calibrated and solved for each country by incorporating each country’s 
capital stock, formal employment, and aggregate consumption. The result of this paper is a new 
panel dataset of informal economic activity for 161 countries ranging from 1950 to 2009. My 
study employs these shadow economy estimations (as a percent of GDP) as the dependent 
variable of the model that I construct. 
Within the shadow economy literature, a number of papers have considered the 
determinants of informal sector activity (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1998b, 
Friedman, et al. 2000). Schneider (2012) summarizes the findings of 22 different empirical 
studies into six main causes of increased shadow economic activity: (1) increase of the tax and 
social security contribution burdens, (2) quality of state institutions, (3) transfers, (4) specific 
labor market regulations, (5) public sector services, and (6) tax morale. Advantageously, these 
six determinants match well with the sub-indices of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
the World index: SIZE_GOVT, SOUND_MONEY, LEGAL_SYSTEM, REGULATION, and 
TRADE_FREEDOM (Gwartney, Lawson, Hall 2012). As such, the independent variables of 
interest in this study are these Fraser Institute sub-indices. Each of these indices are based on a 
scale of 1 to 10 with 10 denoting countries with freer, less obstructed markets (each variable is 
discussed in more detail in this section). They are reported at 5-year intervals from 1975 to 2000, 
and then on an annual basis from 2000 thereafter.  
The sub-index SIZE_GOVT captures four areas: government consumption, transfers and 
subsidies, government enterprises and investment, and the top marginal tax rate. A higher rating 
in this category denotes that a country operates with more personal choice but smaller overall 
government budgets and involvement. In the context of this model, it is expected that higher 
rating for SIZE_GOVT (or smaller government) will decrease shadow activity. Individuals in 
countries with a lower tax burden will not demand an underground economy to escape the 
opportunity costs of higher taxes. Furthermore, corruption is often tied to big government, and 
Goel and Saunoris (2014) have shown that corruption is related to increased informal activity. 




SOUND_MONEY incorporates money growth, inflation, and freedom to own foreign 
currency. A higher score indicates that a country exhibits low and stable rates of inflation and 
allows for the use of alternative currencies. A stable money supply would encourage individuals 
to operate formally, thus decreasing the need for the shadow economy. Furthermore, fewer 
restrictions on foreign currency use would additionally decrease the need to hide economic 
activity. Mauritius ranks highest for SOUND_MONEY while Uganda and Democratic Republic 
of the Congo are ranked lowest. 
The variable LEGAL_SYSTEM describes the strength of a county’s legal system and its 
respect for property rights. Specifically, this index accounts for judicial independence, impartial 
courts, protection of property rights, military interference in rule of law and politics, integrity of 
the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property, reliability of the police, and business costs of crime. All of these factors help determine 
how friendly a country is to official business; businesses have more incentive to operate formally 
if they know that they will have the legal support and protection of the country’s government. 
Therefore, one would expect that a higher score in this variable would equate to a lower level of 
informal activity. The countries Botswana and Mauritius receive the highest ratings for this 
category while the Democratic Republic of the Congo is ranked lowest.  
REGULATION describes the extent of regulations that exist in credit markets, labor 
markets, and for businesses. According to this definition, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
is considered most highly regulated while Botswana, South Africa, and Mauritius are the least 
regulated. All else equal, I expect that for a higher score of REGULATION, there will be lower 
levels of informal sector activity. Similar to the reasoning put forth for the LEGAL_SYSTEM 
variable, an environment more favorable for the growth of formal business will not cause 
individuals to resort to hiding in the shadow economy.  
The final economic variable that I consider is TRADE_FREEDOM. The freedom to trade 
internationally incorporates the impact of tariffs, regulatory trade barriers, black-market 
exchange rates, and controls of the movement of capital and people. A high rating on this sub-
index indicates that a country facilitates international trade with low tariffs and few impediments 
to movement across international borders. The literature on trade liberalization and its effect on 
the informal sector is mixed. Jansen and Lee (2007) describe the arguments for why trade 
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liberalization may decrease or increase informal sector activity. On the one hand, free trade 
creates new markets and job opportunities through increased trade on the international level. At 
the same time, new foreign competition may cause domestic firms to reduce the cost of labor by 
diminishing the role of current employees or even subcontracting with informal establishments. 
Goel and Saunoris (2014) point out that “underground businesses deal with other firms, who 
themselves might not also be operating underground.” Trade is freest in Zambia, Uganda, and 
Botswana while it is most controlled in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria.  
So far, I have considered the direct effects that each of these economic institutional 
variables should create in a country. However, the objective of the spatial analysis is to also 
consider the spillover effects of these economic variables on the basis of a country’s 
geographical neighbors. There are two main possibilities. On the one hand, countries with lower 
(or higher) institutional ratings may share similar institutional structures as their neighbors. 
Whether by specific economic ties or cultural similarities shared in a particular region, these 
neighbors may therefore exhibit similar shadow economy levels as a result. If black markets 
have the potential to spill over across borders, we would expect higher or lower levels of 
unofficial activity to be regionally similar. On the other hand, it is possible that countries with 
lower (or higher) shadow economies as a result of internal institutional channels (direct effects 
only) may appear to have a relatively larger or smaller unofficial economy when compared to 
their neighbors. From this perspective, the spatial analysis would accentuate the contrast between 
two countries and their respective levels of informal activity. Because of these possibilities, the 
existence and the sign of the indirect effects of institutional quality on the shadow economies of 
neighboring countries are ambiguous at this point. The results will reveal more information about 
the nature of the channels of black markets in this region.  
Using the variables described above, I create a panel of 18 sub-Saharan African countries 
averaged over five 5-year periods from 1980 to 2004. Descriptive statistics are displayed in 
Table 1. For context within the framework of this paper, the country with the lowest GDP per 
capita in the sample is $236 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the country with the largest 
is $9,677 (Botswana). Countries with the smallest informal sector as a share of GDP include 
Mauritius and South Africa (about 25%) while the countries with the largest informal sector as a 
share of GDP are Tanzania and Zimbabwe (about 65%). Countries that fall about in the middle 
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of the range are Botswana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (informal sector of about 
42% of GDP).  
 
 
4.4 Spatial model 
In order to develop the geographical relationship among the 18 sub-Saharan African countries in 
my study, I draw on the family of spatial panel econometric models tailored from the general 
form13:  













In the context of my model, i indexes the cross-sectional dimension of the 18 countries being 
considered (i = 1, . . . , 18) while t represents the five time periods (t = 1, . . . , 5). Each 
observation of the dependent variable Shadow_economy is defined for a specific i and t by yit. 
The independent variables are contained in the (1, K) row vector shown as xit, and β represents 
the corresponding (K, 1) vector of unknown parameters. Space- and time-period fixed effects are 
incorporated in the terms µi and λt. The error is denoted by the term uit.  
 The spatial weights matrix, W, establishes the geographical relationship among the 
countries. Based on the latitude and longitude coordinates of the countries, wij is designated as 1 
if countries i and j are neighbors and 0 if they are not. The three closest countries to a given 
country, based on latitude and longitude coordinates, are considered to be neighbors; all others 
are not. It is this weights matrix upon which the applicable spatial modeling will hinge. As a 
result of its inclusion, in the presence of spatial autocorrelation in either the dependent variable 
or the error term, δ and ρ will capture this relationship.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Notation for spatial panel data models described in Elhorst (2010a). 
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 Given the general form of the model (Equation 1), different cases can be considered. This 
is accomplished by restricting the parameters ϒ, δ, and ρ in order to create the spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR), spatial error model (SEM), and spatial Durbin model (SDM). In the 
case of the SAR model, the parameters are set so that ϒ = 0 and ρ = 0. This means that the 
spatial dependence exists only in the dependent variable. On the other hand, when spatial 
dependence occurs only in the error term, the SEM model is constructed with ϒ=0 and δ = 0. 
Finally, the SDM model places the restriction ρ = 0 which allows for spatial dependence in both 
the independent and dependent variables.     
 Given that I hope to uncover the channels of spatial spillovers causing varying levels of 
informal sector activity across borders, it is most reasonable to employ the spatial Durbin model 
(SDM) in the context of this paper. This will allow me to consider the individual institutional 
economic variables as conduits of spatial spillovers. In determining if a fixed effects model 
(country and/or time) is necessary, two Likelihood Ratio tests assess the null hypothesis that 
each type of effect is equal to zero when comparing a restricted and unrestricted model. When 
testing for country fixed effects (H0: µ1, µ2, . . . , µn = 0), the conclusion is to reject the null 
hypothesis (LR: 204.63, p-value 0.0000).  However, the results of the period fixed effects 
indicate a decision to fail to reject (LR: -2.8649, p-value 0.7248) the null hypothesis (H0: λ1, λ2, . 
. . , λt = 0). Therefore, a spatial Durbin model using country fixed effects is most appropriate. 
The results of this model are reported and discussed in the following section. 
 
4.5 Results and Discussion 
As a baseline, Table 2 provides the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) non-spatial model 
with country fixed effects. Two of the independent variables prove to be significant: 
LEGAL_SYSTEM and SOUND_MONEY. From this non-spatial approach, the model shows that 
as there is an increase in the rating of a country’s legal system (stronger legal system and 
protection of property rights), there is a decrease in the shadow economy. Likewise, less shadow 
activity is perceived in countries with a sounder money supply. Both of these findings support 
the hypothesis that individuals in a more stable country with a strong legal foundation would 
have less need for an underground economy.  
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 However, the OLS model ignores the possibility of spatial dependence. According to 
LeSage and Pace (2009), estimating the model with OLS could lead to biased, inconsistent, or 
inefficient results because of the possibility of spatial correlation. LeSage and Pace note that the 
SDM model should be used when (1) there is an omitted variable that is spatially correlated, and 
(2) this omitted spatially correlated variable is correlated with an included independent variable. 
As discussed earlier, the SDM model allows for spatial dependence in both the independent and 
dependent variables making it most appropriate for this investigation where independent 
institutional variables are expected to be the conduits of spatial spillovers. 
The results of the SDM model are displayed in Table 3 and 4. Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1998b suggest that estimating the unofficial share of the economy should 
incorporate a control for the “wealthy country” effect. Wealthier countries have been shown to 
have a lower level of unofficial economy across studies. For this reason, I include GDP per 
capita as an additional independent variable in Table 4. GDPPC carries the expected negative 
sign; as a country is wealthier, that country’s informal activity goes down. This supports the 
hypothesis that a stronger official economy will have less need for an unofficial economy.  
The results in both tables are quantitatively similar with the exception of additional 
significance of the variable REGULATION when controlling for GDP. Therefore, I begin by 
reporting the results of Table 3. The spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable is 
(measured by ρ) is equal to -0.306 and is significant at the 5 per cent level. This negative result 
indicates a “checkerboard pattern” where neighbors actually have dissimilar levels of shadow 
economic activity. This parameter shows that a country with a relatively high level of informal 
activity will have neighbors with relatively lower levels of informal activity. Looking at the 
dependent variable alone, it does not appear that informal sector activity crosses borders. 
However, for each independent variable, we can measure the direct, indirect, and total 
effects on shadow economic activity. By looking at these effects, it can be determined whether 
some of the institutional variables do in fact spill over onto neighboring countries, which in turn, 
may affect the level of informal sector activity. The direct effects describe the impact that the 
economic variables of a single country have on its own country. Although numerical magnitudes 
cannot be compared between spatial models and OLS, the results show that there is a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between SOUND_MONEY and LEGAL_SYSTEM and 
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informal activity in that country consistent with the sign in the OLS model. As a country 
demonstrates a relatively stable money supply, there will be less demand for hidden economic 
activity. Likewise, a stronger legal system with protection of property rights provides incentive 
for business owners to operate legally within the confines of the official economy without 
turning to an alternative market. On the other hand, the variable TRADE_FREEDOM is positive 
and significantly associated with informal activity. This supports the hypothesis that as economic 
flows between countries become more open, there may be more opportunity for black market 
networks to grow as well.  
 Next, I turn to a discussion of the indirect effects. In the context of this model, the 
indirect effects can be thought of as the impact that the level of institutional quality in one 
country has on a neighbor’s informal activity. One significant result is obtained in both Table 3 
and 4. As a country’s SIZE_GOVT index increases (an increase in this index means a smaller 
government, smaller tax burden), a neighbor’s overall level of shadow activity decreases. This 
suggests that sub-Saharan neighbors may tend to share similar levels of government involvement 
(either learned or developed alongside one another). Alternatively, this finding can be explained 
by the ties between the shadow economy and corruption that Goel and Saunoris (2014) explored. 
Smaller government size in one country may reduce corruption in both that country and decrease 
opportunities for corruption ties between countries.  
 The final column of Table 3 captures the total effects of each independent variable on 
shadow economic activity. As the sum of the direct and indirect effects, total effects indicate 
how changes in the economic explanatory variables affect total shadow economic activity by 
including both own-country and neighboring country spillover effects. Increased ratings in 
SIZE_GOVT are related to lower levels of shadow activity.  
Turning to the slightly diverging results in Table 4, the other significant indirect effect is 
the positive relationship between REGULATION and the shadow economy. This implies that as 
the REGULATION score in one country increases (an increase in the index denotes less 
regulatory interference), informal activity in a neighboring country actually increases. This 
indirect effect may be capturing a relative comparison between countries. Less regulation in a 
given country is expected to decrease shadow economic activity in that country. However, if 
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shadow economic activity in that country decreases as a result of less regulation, this may make 
surrounding areas appear to have relatively higher levels of informal activity.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
One conclusion of this study is evident from the direct effects of the spatial Durbin model: 
improved legal and property protection in addition to a sound money supply decrease informality 
within a given country. This corresponds with findings across the literature (Schneider 2012). On 
the other hand, TRADE_FREEDOM is associated with higher levels of shadow economic 
activity. Freer markets in this area may create and expand market networks within both formal 
and informal categories of economic activity.   
There is also evidence of indirect effects across the region. The results show that these 
indirect spatial spillovers occur through the channel of SIZE_GOVT; countries that are neighbors 
to a country with less intrusive government oversight are likely to have lower levels of shadow 
economic activity themselves. This is likely an indication that neighboring countries imitate and 
establish governments with similar roles and tax regimes as local neighbors.  
Tracing potential sources of shadow economic activity is particularly critical in the 
developing world. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) suggest that unofficial sector growth 
creates a downward-spiraling chain reaction fueled by the ensuing low tax collection and 
subsequent inadequate public goods in the official sector. A vicious cycle such as this would be 
difficult to break out of in order to achieve (official) economic growth.  
At the same time, the existence of a strong informal sector in a country indicates potential 
resources that could be used for growth if they were formalized. De Soto refers to the 
underground economy as “dead capital” but proposes that governments of these nations have the 
opportunity “to integrate [informal] resources into an orderly and coherent legal framework” (De 
Soto 2000, p. 30). This integration process might mean bolstering economic institutions as 
indicated by the results of this paper. In turn, since institutions in one country have the capacity 






Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=90) 
Variable Mean Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
Shadow_economy 42.641 10.918 22.884 66.512 
GDPPC 1,603.507 2011.222 236.487 9677.452 
SIZE_GOVT 5.664 1.402 1.960 8.376 
SOUND_MONEY 5.121 2.460 0 9.522 
LEGAL_SYSTEM 4.556 1.419 1.490 7.580 
REGULATION 5.244 1.039 2.910 7.544 





Table 2. Non-spatial fixed effects model (N=90 T=5) 
Dependent variable: Shadow economy estimate (% of GDP) 













R2= 0.1439  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 









Table 3. Spatial Durbin model (SDM) results (N=90, T=5) 
Dependent Variable: Shadow economy estimate (% of GDP) 































ρ = -0.306 
(t-stat: -2.101 p-value: 0.036) 
R2=0.9477, Corr2=0.2312 
Notes: Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals for the effects estimates are underneath the estimates in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table	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Table 4. Spatial Durbin model (SDM) results (N=90, T=5) controlling for GDP per capita 
Dependent Variable: Shadow economy estimate (% of GDP) 





































ρ = -0.286 
(t-stat: -1.985 p-value: 0.047) 
R2=0.9590, Corr2=0.4123 
Notes: Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals for the effects estimates are underneath the estimates in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
	  
 All three chapters point to a shared conclusion: institutions do matter for health and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. In Chapter 2, even when controlling for a number of cultural 
factors associated with religion, CHRISTIANITY remains significantly correlated with HIV 
prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa. The results of the third chapter indicate that health outcomes 
are positively impacted by economic freedom but not by democracy. Chapter 4 concludes that a 
strong legal system with protection of property and a sound money supply reduce the size of a 
country’s informal sector. Moreover, countries that are neighbors to countries with less intrusive 
governments and lower taxes tend to have lower levels of informal sector activity themselves.  
Nevertheless, while institutions are shown to be important for a variety of outcomes in this 
region, this research still leaves many questions unanswered about the precise manner in which 
these institutions matter. Although Christianity has been linked to HIV in Africa, it appears that 
there is still a more specific factor associated with the religion that remains to be uncovered. 
Also, determining the direction of causality between condom use and HIV will provide a better 
understanding of whether condoms are improving or worsening the epidemic. In Chapter 3, the 
interaction of SIZE_GOVT with WATER_ACCESS suggested that countries with relatively less 
water access may actually benefit from a larger government to coordinate the distribution of 
public goods. Likewise, other resources may interact in differing ways with various kinds of 
economic freedom. Finally, the results of the fourth chapter suggest further investigation may 
help to determine why fewer regulations in one country may contribute to a larger shadow 
economy in a neighboring country. It is possible that the model is capturing a relative contrast 
between countries, but it may also be a result of a different conclusion. Future research in all of 
these areas will contribute to determining how institutions affect growth and development, 
specifically in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The intention of this dissertation is not to disprove that geography, climate, and natural resources 
matter for growth and development of a nation. Rather, the focus is on the importance of 
institutions in contributing to these same outcomes. By limiting the scope of this study to the 
sub-Saharan region, I am able to capture the variation that emerges from nations of a shared 
geographical location as a consequence of the differing institutional structures of each society. 
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This is a significant contribution in understanding and improving these African economies and 
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